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Note
Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary
Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social
Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications
Nicholas R. Bednar*
In 2003, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang threatened to
kill Mauricio Edgardo Valdiviezo-Galdamez for refusing to join
1
their gang. Two-to-three times a week, gang members shot at
him, yelling, “Don’t run. Don’t be afraid. Sooner or later you
2
will join us.” Mauricio filed five separate police reports, but “he
3
received no response from the police.” In September 2004,
members of MS-13 kidnapped Mauricio, drove him into the
4
mountains of Guatemala, and beat him for five hours. The
gang members told Mauricio that they “were no longer offering
him the option of joining their gang, and had decided to kill
5
him instead.” Mauricio escaped. Fearing for his life, he fled to
the United States in October 2004 and applied for asylum while
6
in removal proceedings.
* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota; B.A. 2012, University
of Minnesota. Thank you to Professor Benjamin Casper and Professor Stephen
Meili for their comments and assistance in researching this Note. Additional
thanks to Tina Zedginidze, Grace Doherty, and Matthew Bolger for their
comments and critiques. Thank you also to Emily Scholtes, Rebecca Furdek,
Laura Farley, Ian Jackson, Mary Scott, and the staff of the Minnesota Law
Review for their editorial expertise. My sincere appreciation is extended to
Karianne Jones for her invaluable support and tolerance of my fervorous ramblings as I constantly toyed with, overturned, and restructured this Note. To
my father, Jody Bednar, thank you for teaching me practical skills and common sense. To my mother, Catherine Hall, thank you for enticing me to learn,
develop, and ask questions when answers were not readily accessible or apparent. You both tolerated my recurring moving from dwelling to dwelling as I
traveled the world, changed my path, and achieved new goals. Copyright ©
2015 by Nicholas R. Bednar.
1. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582,
586 (3d Cir. 2011).
2. Id. at 587.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 586.
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An asylum applicant, like Mauricio, must establish that he
or she was persecuted on one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
7
opinion. Applicants unable to claim asylum on one of the four
more specific protected grounds—for instance those fleeing
8
9
gang violence, victims of female genital mutilation (FGM), or
10
victims of domestic violence —claim asylum on the basis of
membership in a particular social group. These applicants must
produce evidence showing that their particular social group (1)
shares an immutable characteristic; (2) is defined with particu11
larity; and (3) is socially distinct. Mauricio claimed he was a
member of a particular social group made of “Honduran youth
who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have re12
fused to join because they oppose the gangs.”
Mauricio’s application was denied by an Immigration
Judge (IJ), appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), and subsequently remanded by the Third Circuit to allow the BIA to distinguish between particularity and social dis13
tinction. On February 7, 2014, in Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA
used Mauricio’s case to “clarify” its interpretation of the partic14
ular social group standard. According to the BIA, particularity
15
defines the “outer limits” of the group’s boundaries. Social distinction requires the particular social group to be “perceived as
16
a group by society.” The applicant has the burden of proof to
produce corroborating evidence, “such as country conditions re7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
8. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 588 (claiming “Honduran
youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but have refused to join because they oppose the gangs” as a social group).
9. See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996)
(claiming “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice” as a social
group).
10. See, e.g., Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014)
(claiming “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a social group).
11. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014).
12. Id. at 228.
13. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 587–88, 608 (“[W]e are hardpressed to discern any difference between the requirement of ‘particularity’
and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibility.’”).
14. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 229. Matter of W-G-R- accompanied M-E-V-G- as a companion case and is thoroughly discussed in Part I.B.
of this Note. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
15. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238 (citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341
F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)).
16. Id. at 240–42.
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ports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities, and the like,”
demonstrating that the particular social group is socially dis17
tinct. Following this discussion, the BIA denied Mauricio’s
asylum application because his proposed particular social group
failed to satisfy these “clarif[ied]” elements of particularity and
18
social distinction.
Rather than clarifying the particular social group standard, the BIA’s decision in M-E-V-G- creates a game of semantics that requires an applicant to navigate the fine line between
social distinction and particularity. As the National Immigrant
Justice Center (NIJC) suggests, an applicant cannot easily define a particular social group that satisfies both particularity
19
and social distinction. If the applicant defines her group too
discretely, the group may fail to satisfy the element of social
distinction because the society in question is unlikely to perceive it as a group. But an amorphous or overbroad particular
social group, according to BIA precedent, fails the requirement
of particularity. To avoid denial of her application due to a lack
of either particularity or social distinction, the applicant must
define her particular social group with calculated wording.
If the applicant succeeds in articulating an acceptable particular social group, she will still need to present evidence that
the particular social group is recognizable to the society in
question. This evidence—mostly in the form of expert witness20
es—is largely unavailable to pro se asylum applicants. As
such, the BIA’s current interpretations of social distinction and
particularity result in unnecessarily high bars for pro se asylum applicants. Furthermore, the need for sociological evidence
is inconsistent with BIA precedent, which, prior to M-E-V-G-,
avoided defining particularity in a manner that would require
17. Id. at 244.
18. Id. at 249 (relying on Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- in concluding that “the applicant’s membership in a particular social group was not
established because he did not show that the proposed group was sufficiently
particular or socially distinct”).
19. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF M-E-V-G- AND
MATTER OF W-G-R- 5 (2014) [hereinafter NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY], https://
www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/NIJC%20PSG%
20Practice%20Advisory_ Final_3.4.14.pdf.
20. See generally Sarah R. Goodman, Note, Asking for Too Much? The
Role of Corroborating Evidence in Asylum Proceedings in the United States
and United Kingdom, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1733 (2013) (concluding that
United States evidence requirements for immigration are unrealistic given the
situation of refugees).
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21

“sociological analysis.”
Scholars and immigrant rights activists contend that the
most effective way to reduce prejudice to pro se applicants is to
eliminate the elements of particularity and social distinction
22
from the particular social group standard. Yet the opinion in
M-E-V-G- makes clear that the BIA has no intention of abandoning these elements. Consequently, this Note proposes an alternative precedential fact-finding regime, based on the United
Kingdom’s Country Guidance System, to eliminate the burden
on pro se applicants of producing sociological evidence in many
asylum adjudications. Part I begins by evaluating the evidentiary standards of the United States and United Kingdom asylum systems. It then describes the evolution of the particular
social group standard in United States case law. Part II analyzes the new undue burdens created by the elements of particularity and social distinction on pro se applicants. This analysis
concludes that the implicit requirement of sociological evidence
prevents pro se applicants from defining a satisfactory particular social group. Part III proposes a system of precedent-setting
cases—similar to the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System—that provide standardized evidence and factual findings
in certain types of asylum claims to decrease the systemic prejudices against pro se applicants. The BIA would frame these
decisions around particular forms of persecution or countries,
to allow the courts to compare asylum claims against prede23
termined, authoritative sets of country conditions. Such a system overcomes the restrictively high standards of particularity
and social distinction without requiring a change in the definition of particular social group.

21. Compare Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244 (requiring applicants to present “evidence such as country conditions reports, expert witness
testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical
animosities, and the like” to establish “particularity”), with Matter of S-E-G-,
24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (quoting Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)) (noting that the Second Circuit in Ucelo-Gomez v.
Mukasey declined to find that “wealth” satisfied the “particularity” requirement, as it “would necessitate a sociological analysis as to how persons with
various assets would have been viewed by others in their country”).
22. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
23. See generally CM Zimbabwe CG, [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) (establishing
country guidance for Zimbabwe political claims); MK Albania CG, [2009]
UKAIT 36 (protecting Albanian lesbians); RT Sri Lanka CG, [2008] UKAIT 9
(establishing guidance for medical reports and scarring in asylum claims);
Robert Thomas, Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and
the Asylum Process in the United Kingdom, 20 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 489 (2008)
(explaining the country guidance system in the United Kingdom).
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I. THE INCREASING DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Before analyzing how the BIA’s interpretation of particularity and social distinction has resulted in unreasonably high
burdens for pro se applicants, it is imperative to understand
how the definition has evolved. As a preface to this history,
Section A provides a brief look into the inherent procedural
burdens in the United States asylum procedures and the United Kingdom’s solution to these problems. Section B addresses
the evolution of the definition of particular social group in the
United States from the inception of the immutable characteristic standard to the addition of social visibility and particularity.
It then describes how the BIA changed social visibility and particularity in M-E-V-G- and subsequent cases.
A. UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM ASYLUM
PROCEDURES
To examine the evidentiary difficulties of proving particularity and social distinction, one must first understand the inherent procedural burdens in the United States immigration
system. Subsection 1 examines two barriers to asylum for pro
se applicants: the lack of counsel and the evidentiary burden of
proof. As this Note ultimately argues for the adoption of an alternative precedential fact-finding system, Subsection 2 surveys the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System. Later in
this Note, Part III expands on this background and argues that
the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System, while partially flawed, serves as an ideal template for a similar United
24
States precedential fact-finding system.
1. Asylum Law in the United States
Like many countries, the United States derives its definition of “refugee” from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta25
tus of Refugees. Indeed, the 1980 Refugee Act adopted a defi24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. Some countries, such as Sweden, have
expanded the definition of refugee to protect groups persecuted on account of
other grounds, including gender and sexual orientation. See, e.g., 4 ch. 1
§ Utlänningslag (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2005:716) (Swed.). At least
one piece of forthcoming scholarship suggests that the United States should
expand its own refugee definition to encompass gender. See generally Tina
Zedginidze, Note, Domestic Abuse and Gang Violence Against Women: Expanding the Particular Social Group Finding in Matter of A-R-C-G- to Grant Asy-
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nition of refugee analogous to the Convention’s definition:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality. . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
26
group, or political opinion . . . .

To obtain asylum in the United States, applicants must
persuade the adjudicator that they meet all of the elements of
the above definition—including persecution on account of one of
the five protected grounds. The identity of the adjudicator depends on whether or not the applicant applies for asylum affirmatively or defensively. Applicants not in removal proceedings apply affirmatively to United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) and appear before an asylum of27
ficer for a non-adversarial interview. Applicants in removal
proceedings may apply defensively before an IJ as a defense to
28
removal. Unlike in affirmative asylum proceedings, removal
proceedings before an IJ are adversarial and the applicant
must contend against an attorney from United States Immigra29
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Both affirmative and defensive proceedings present asylum
applicants with numerous legal, linguistic, and economic barri30
ers—many of which are outside the scope of this Note. Moreolum to Women Persecuted by Gangs, 34 J. L. & INEQ. (forthcoming 2016) (encouraging the Department of Justice to propose legislation to incorporate gender as a sixth protected ground that could later be adopted by Congress).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (emphasis added). Compare id. (providing for the five protected grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion), with Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152 (providing for
the same five protected grounds), and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (defining “refugee” as “any person
within the definition of article 1 of the Convention [Relating to the Status of
Refugees]”).
27. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (2014); 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b).
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
29. See DEP’T OF JUST., THE IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 9
(2009) (“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enforces the immigration and nationality laws and represents the United States government’s interests in immigration proceedings . . . . DHS is entirely separate from the Department of Justice and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. When
appearing before an Immigration Court, DHS is deemed a party to the proceedings and is represented by its component, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).”).
30. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing asylum seekers as “poor, illiterate people who do not speak English and
are unable to retain counsel”). For a more thorough analysis of procedural
burdens, see generally Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The Detri-
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31

ver, unlike in criminal proceedings, the government does not
provide affirmative or defensive asylum applicants with legal
32
representation. While the asylum application instructions
33
provide information for obtaining pro bono counsel, one study
suggests only 7% of individuals in removal proceedings are actually represented by pro bono counsel or a nonprofit legal ser34
vice organization. In 2013, 41% of individuals appeared before
35
the IJ without representation. In affirmative proceedings before USCIS, two-thirds of asylum applicants lack representa36
tion. Unfortunately for pro se applicants, representation is
critical to the success of an asylum application. Applicants represented by an attorney before the IJ have a 45.6% grant rate,
37
compared to the 16.3% grant rate for pro se individuals. Without counsel, pro se applicants must rely on the asylum application instructions and pro se manuals provided by non-profit organizations—neither of which provides sufficient guidance on
defining a particular social group that conforms to the expecta-

mental Effects of a Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 27
B.U. INT’L L.J. 61 (2009).
31. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that
criminal defendants have a right to counsel). Removal proceedings are not
criminal proceedings. As determined by the Supreme Court, “deportation is
not a punishment for crime,” it is a civil proceeding. See Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The proceeding before a United
States judge . . . is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or offense. It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the
fact whether the conditions exist upon which congress has enacted that an alien of this class may remain within the country. The order of deportation is
not a punishment for crime. . . . He has not, therefore, been deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the provisions of the Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no application.”).
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government . . . .”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0067, I-589, APPLICATION FOR
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS 4 (2012) [hereinafter I-589 INSTRUCTIONS] (“You have a right to provide your own legal representation at an asylum interview . . . at no cost to the U.S. government.”).
33. I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32 (providing a phone number and
website to obtain information on the availability of pro bono counsel).
34. New York Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice:
The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 381 (2011) [hereinafter NYIRS Justice].
35. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2013 STATISTICS YEARBOOK (2014), http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy13syb.pdf.
36. See Settlage, supra note 30, at 81.
37. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 340 (2007).
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38

tions of the BIA.
In addition, applicants applying for asylum on the basis of
membership in a particular social group encounter evidentiary
39
barriers—shrouded by a decade of convoluted case law —that
often prevent them from proving the social distinction of their
40
particular social group before the asylum officer or the IJ. The
adjudicator determines the existence of a particular social
41
group on a “case-by-case basis.” The applicant has the burden
to produce country condition evidence—documentary or testimonial evidence describing the situation in the foreign country—that the proposed particular social group meets the criteria of an immutable characteristic, particularity, and social
42
distinction. The applicant may rely solely on testimony, but
testimony “may nonetheless fail to satisfy an applicant’s bur43
den of proof.” As IJs and asylum officers are not country con44
dition experts, they may, and often do require, the applicant
45
to submit corroborating evidence.
Traditionally, applicants represented by counsel submit as
38. See I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2 (failing to list the elements of a particular social group); see, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
STUDIES, PRO SE MANUAL (2013), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/
CGRS_Pro_Se_DV_Manual_English_2014_FINAL.pdf (providing brief descriptions of immutable characteristic, particularity, and social visibility requirements, but only in the context of gender violence).
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014).
41. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 227 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on
other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“[A]pplicant must establish . . .
membership in a particular social group . . . was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at
244. Notably, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not binding in immigration
proceedings. See Garry Malphrus, Expert Witnesses in Immigration Proceedings, 4 IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR 2–3 (May 2010); see also Malkandi v. Holder, 576
F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir. 2009).
43. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM ELIGIBILITY PART
IV: BURDEN OF PROOF, STANDARDS OF PROOF, AND EVIDENCE PARTICIPANT
WORKBOOK 6–7 (2006) [hereinafter USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING], http://www
.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%
20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Burden-of-Proof-Standards
-Proof-Evidence-31aug01.pdf.
44. See Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006) (“An IJ is not
an expert on conditions in any given country . . . .”).
45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A. 1997) (“[W]here it is reasonable to expect corroborating
evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s
claim, such evidence should be provided . . . .”). The affirmative asylum process is more forgiving, as the asylum officer is required to research country
conditions. See USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 23.
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country condition evidence the United States Department of
State Human Rights Report, news articles, witness affidavits,
46
and personal documentation. Notably, the State Department
report is often given substantial weight over other evidence,
despite concerns that these reports are “generalized summaries
47
of recent country conditions” and that “the [State] Department
softpedals human rights violations by countries that the United
48
States wants to have good relations with.” In order to rebut an
IJ or BIA finding based on the State Department report the applicant will need to produce “a highly credible independent
49
source of expert knowledge.” If the applicant fails to submit
the requisite evidence, the adjudicator may find that the appli50
cant has failed to meet her burden of proof.
If her application is denied by an IJ, an applicant may ap51
peal to the BIA. The BIA is not permitted to engage in de novo
52
fact-finding, though it may “tak[e] administrative notice” of
53
“current events or the contents of official documents.” Under
current regulations, BIA decisions are precedential only with
54
regard to findings of law. Therefore, adjudicators require each
applicant to independently submit the necessary corroborating
evidence to establish their claim regardless of whether or not
adjudicators granted asylum in previous cases with a similar
factual basis.
While experienced immigration attorneys are aware of these evidentiary requirements, USCIS makes little effort to notify
pro se applicants of the true legal requirements—defined only
by case law—of an asylum application based on membership in
a particular social group. Neither the asylum application nor
its instructions list the three elements of a particular social
55
group—immutability, particularity, and social distinction.
Moreover, the application neither provides a space, nor
46. USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 17–20.
47. Eliot Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on
America’s Asylum System, 2 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 7 (2007).
48. Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 620.
50. Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 733 (“The ‘absence of such corroborating evidence’ alone supports a finding that ‘an applicant has failed to meet
her burden of proof.’”).
51. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(9) (2014).
52. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(ii).
53. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (g).
55. See I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2 (failing to list the elements of a particular social group).
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prompts the applicant to define their particular social group.
While the instructions inform the applicant to submit corroborating evidence showing country conditions and individualized
facts, nowhere do they suggest the applicant should submit sociological evidence establishing the recognition of the particular
57
social group within the society.
The sheer amount of evidence that applicants must submit
in every claim has led jurists to criticize the lack of precedential
fact-finding in United States asylum adjudications. In Banks v.
Gonzales, Judge Easterbrook criticized the BIA for failing to
provide expert evidence. Instead, he suggested that “[w]hat the
immigration bureaucracy needs is a[n] [expert] . . . for each
58
country.” As Judge Easterbrook noted, while the individualized facts of a particular social group claim vary from applicant-to-applicant, the overall country conditions and recognition of the group often do not:
Many disputes about asylum are recurring and could be resolved
once and for all by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney
General, and their delegates . . . . While Taylor ruled Liberia, all ethnic Krahns (and Unity Party supporters) should have been treated
the same way. Similarly, adherents to the Ahmadi sect either are or
are not persecuted in Pakistan . . . . Many asylum claims similarly
could be handled by the sort of detailed regulations that the Social
Security Administration uses. Others, of the kind that arise less frequently, could be resolved with the assistance of country specialists
along the lines of vocational experts. What cannot continue, however,
is administrative refusal to take a standing on recurring questions,
coupled with the reliance on IJs to fill in for the expertise missing
from the record. The immigration bureaucracy has much to learn
from the experience of other federal agencies that handle large num59
bers of comparable claims with individual variations.

As Judge Easterbrook recognized, the United States immigration system needs some form of precedential fact-finding
that allows for speedy adjudication of similar claims and eliminates the need for individual applicants to produce the sociological evidence necessary to satisfy the element of social distinction.
56. See id. at 4.
57. See id. at 7–8 (“You must submit reasonably available corroborative
evidence showing (1) the general conditions in the country from which you are
seeking asylum, and (2) the specific facts on which you are relying to support
your claim. . . . Supporting evidence may include but is not limited to newspaper articles, affidavits of witnesses or experts, medical and/or psychological
records, doctors’ statements, periodicals, journals, books, photographs, official
documents, or personal statements or live testimony from witnesses or experts.”).
58. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006).
59. Id. at 454–55.
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2. The United Kingdom Country Guidance System
The similarities between United States and United Kingdom asylum law facilitate easy comparison. Like the United
States, the United Kingdom derives its definition of “refugee”
60
from the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, unlike the United States, the United Kingdom engages in precedential factfinding through its Country Guidance System. Reminiscent of
Judge Easterbrook’s own frustrations, Lord Justice Sedley,
Judge of the Court of Appeals of England and Wales, explained
that asylum law is not simply the application of facts to a legal
standard, but “a global appraisal of an individual’s past and
prospective situation in a particular cultural, social, political
and legal milieu, judged by a test which, though it has legal
61
and linguistic limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.”
Such an appraisal is unwieldy when an adjudicator must engage in this “global appraisal” on a case-by-case basis. As such,
the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance System addresses
some of the evidentiary concerns for pro se asylum applicants
discussed above in Subsection 1.
Adopted in 2003, the Country Guidance System produces
decisions that advise lower courts “on how asylum appeals from
a particular country are to be approached by decision mak62
ers.” The process of issuing a Country Guidance Determination begins when the United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) identifies an appeal that requires broader
63
country condition examination. The Tribunal frames the issue
in one of three ways: (1) the conditions of a particular country;
(2) the risk of a particular group; or (3) risk factors used to
64
evaluate whether an individual is at risk of persecution.
Once the Tribunal frames the issue, the asylum appellant
and the Home Office present substantial country condition evi65
dence and country-specific experts before a three judge panel.
60. Accord The Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection
(Qualification) Regulations, (2006) § 2 (UK) (“‘[R]efugee’ means a person who
falls within Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention . . . .”); UNHCR—About Us,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2015) (referring to the 1951 Refugee Convention as the “Geneva Refugee Convention”). This Note avoids using the term Geneva Convention to avoid confusion with the other Geneva Conventions.
61. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Shah [1997] Imm.A.R. 145, 153 (HC).
62. Thomas, supra note 23, at 490.
63. See id. at 502–03.
64. See id. at 511–14.
65. See id. at 494.
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Procedurally, it is difficult to classify the presentation of country condition evidence in the United Kingdom system as strictly
adversarial or inquisitorial. Professor Robert Thomas, an expert on the United Kingdom asylum process, best explains the
difference between traditional appellate decisions and Country
Guidance Determinations:
Traditionally, this has been an adversarial appellate jurisdiction . . . . However, the task of producing authoritative country guidance is of a different nature from that of determining individual asylum appeals. If the Tribunal were strictly confined to the body of
evidence presented before it by the parties, even though it was aware
that this omitted other potentially material evidence, then this would
undermine the whole purpose of producing authoritative guidance.
The country guidance exercise can therefore assume “something of an
inquisitorial quality, although the adversarial structure of the appeal
procedure of course remains.” In this respect, much may depend upon
the awareness of the senior judges of recent country information and
the discussion between the parties at pre-hearing reviews concerning
66
the sources of country information to be relied upon.

Following this mixed adversarial-inquisitorial fact-finding
exercise, the Tribunal issues an opinion with broad findings of
fact applicable to asylum claims stemming from similar cir67
cumstances. Unlike BIA decisions in the United States, the
factual findings of a United Kingdom Country Guidance Determination are binding on lower courts, as long as it “(a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and (b) depends
68
upon the same or similar evidence.” Appellants may challenge
the Country Guidance Determination as an error of law or
based on evidence that it has been “superseded by a change in
69
country conditions or that new evidence has come to light.”
While the Country Guidance System promotes efficiency
and consistency in asylum adjudications, it is not without its
faults. First, practitioners have attacked the Tribunal’s failure
70
to explain how it weighs evidence when making its decision.
66. Id. at 509.
67. Cf. CM Zimbabwe CG, [2013] UKUT 59 (IAC) (examining country
guidance for Zimbabwe political claims); AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445
(IAC) (discussing asylees from Somalia); MK Albania CG, [2009] UKAIT 36
(establishing country guidance for Albanian lesbians); RT Sri Lanka CG,
[2008] UKAIT 9 (establishing guidance for medical reports and scarring in
asylum claims).
68. TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, PRACTICE DIRECTIONS: IMMIGRATION & ASYLUM CHAMBERS OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL AND THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
¶ 12.2 (2014) (U.K.) [hereinafter PRACTICE DIRECTIONS], http://www.judiciary
.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/revised-pd-3112014.pdf.
69. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505.
70. See IMMIGRATION ADVISORY SERV., COUNTRY GUIDELINE CASES: BENIGN AND PRACTICAL? 38–39 (Colin Yeo ed., 2005), http://www.freemovement
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Second, the risks of poor decision-making in a country guidance
case are higher than in an individualized claim, as the resulting precedent has the potential to affect an entire class of asy71
lum seekers. Finally, country guidance decisions issued to
date tend to be negative to the asylum appellant—limiting ra72
ther than expanding protection for future applicants. These
flaws, however, do not deprive the United Kingdom Country
Guidance System of the protection it provides to asylum applicants otherwise unable to produce thorough country condition
evidence.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP
Since 2006, the BIA has continued to tighten the require73
ments of the particular social group formulation. Subsection 1
discusses the BIA’s adoption of the Acosta standard in 1985,
which required members of the particular social group to share
74
a common immutable characteristic. For two decades, federal
circuit courts and other common law nations embraced the
75
Acosta standard. As Subsection 2 reveals, in 2006 the BIA began requiring applicants to define their particular social group
with particularity and social visibility. Legal scholars and the
Seventh Circuit have resisted the BIA’s addition of these elements. Finally, Subsection 3 recounts the BIA’s more recent decisions in 2014—Matter of M-E-V-G-, Matter of W-G-R-, and
Matter of A-R-C-G-—applying the newest elements to the particular social group formulation. Despite the hopeful outcome in
A-R-C-G-, the BIA’s most recent particular social group case,
the reformulation of “particularity” and “social distinction” in
M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- erects evidentiary barriers that cannot
be overcome by pro se applicants.

.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Country-Guideline-cases-benign-and
-practical.pdf.
71. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 498.
72. See id. at 523.
73. See infra Part I.B.2–3.
74. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A.
1987).
75. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility”
in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47,
48–49 (2008).
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1. The Acosta Standard
At the 1951 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons, the Swedish delegation
urged the inclusion of particular social groups in the refugee
definition. They noted, “[s]uch cases existed, and it would be as
76
well to mention them explicitly.” As previously mentioned, the
United States implemented the 1951 Refugee Convention definition—and its five protected grounds—in the 1980 Refugee
Act. Yet neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1980 Refugee Act
77
explicitly define particular social group. Furthermore, the legislative history surrounding the 1980 Refugee Act ignores the
meaning of particular social group, favoring instead wholesale
78
adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention’s definition. Without
this statutory or legislative guidance, the BIA and circuit
courts have struggled to develop a consistent—and coherent—
definition of particular social group.
In 1986, Matter of Acosta presented the BIA with the first
opportunity to interpret the phrase “particular social group.”
The BIA—citing the lack of guidance and using the interpreta79
tive canon of ejusdem generis —adopted the immutable charac80
teristic standard. Under the immutable characteristic standard, members of a particular social group must share “a
characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual
to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or con81
science that it ought not be required to be changed.” Support76. See Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, UNHCR (Nov. 26, 1951), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cda4
.html.
77. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
78. See Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons, supra note 76; Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at
Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social
Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 513–14 (1993).
79. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“We find the wellestablished doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning literally, ‘of the same kind,’
to be most helpful in construing the phrase ‘membership in a particular social
group.’ That doctrine holds that general words used in an enumeration with
specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific
words . . . . Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerated in the Act
and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either unable
by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, to
avoid persecution.” (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
80. See id. at 232–34.
81. Id. at 233. For a more thorough analysis of the Acosta standard, see
generally REGINA GERMAIN, ASYLUM PRIMER 50–58 (6th ed. 2010); IRA J.
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ers of the Acosta standard favored its extension of protection to
otherwise unprotected groups, such as women and homosexu82
als. Critics attacked its denial of protection to “groups who
may well be targets of persecution based on their associations
83
that are widely recognized in society.” Despite these criticisms, the majority of federal circuits embraced the new stand84
ard.
The Acosta standard resulted in expansive protection for
large and otherwise unprotected groups. For example, in Hassan v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit accepted “Somali females”
as a particular social group, finding that “all Somali females
have a well-founded fear of persecution . . . given the preva85
lence of FGM.” Hassan is perhaps the broadest particular social group an appellate court has ever adopted, but remains illustrative of the potential protection offered by the Acosta
standard. More representative of common particular social
groups during the Acosta era, the BIA and circuit courts have
also accepted particular social groups defined by homosexuali86
87
88
ty, forced marriage, ethnicity, and a variety of other immuKURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 559–67 (13th ed. 2012).
82. James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Discussion Paper, Membership
of a Particular Social Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 481–82, 486–90
(2002) (providing pros and cons of the immutable characteristic test).
83. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of “Membership of a Particular Social
Group,” in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263, 295 (Erika Fuller et al.
eds., 2003) (suggesting groups such as students, union members, and professionals will not be protected under the immutable characteristic standard).
Adjudicators frequently refuse to recognize “particular social groups” defined
by employment. Cf. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying asylum to a “campesino cheesemaker”).
84. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005);
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546–48 (6th Cir. 2003); Lwin v. INS,
144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir.
1994); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909
F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). But see Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1574–
75 (9th Cir. 1986) (adopting the “voluntary associational relationship” test).
Since Sanchez-Truijllo, the Ninth Circuit has shifted more towards the Acosta
standard. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000),
vacated on other grounds, 409 F.3d 177 (2006); GERMAIN, supra note 81, at 52.
85. See Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007). But see
Safaie, 25 F.3d at 640 (rejecting “Iranian women” as a particular social group
for being “overbroad”).
86. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A.
1990).
87. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
88. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding Bihari living in Bangladesh to be a particular social group); Ali v.
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89

table characteristics. The size of the population of the group
remained irrelevant, so long as the particular social group was
grounded so deeply in the identity of the individual it would be
impossible or unreasonable to suggest it should be changed to
avoid persecution.
As the critics feared, the BIA and circuit courts rejected
particular social group claims that demonstrated persecution,
but failed to meet the immutable characteristic standard. For
example, the First Circuit rejected “campesino cheesemakers”
as a particular social group, even though “cheesemakers are
especially likely to be subjected to guerilla demands for food be90
cause the hard cheese . . . is resistant to spoilage.” Deferring
to the BIA, the First Circuit reasoned employment is something
91
that an individual has “the power to change.” Thus, Acosta did
not open the floodgates to any individual able to cognizably allege persecution. Despite these limitations, for two decades
Acosta broadened protection to asylum seekers while providing
a coherent standard for adjudicators to apply.
2. The Addition of the Particularity and Social Visibility Tests
Most common law countries—in particular Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom—adopted some formulation
92
of the immutable characteristic standard derived from Acosta.
Australia, however, formulated a social perception test that examined “whether or not a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a cognizable group or sets them apart
Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 784–87 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding gang-rape of asylum
seeker was on account of her membership in the Midgan clan of Somalia);
Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding Bulgarian national of Roma descent constituted a particular social group).
89. See, e.g., Lwin, 144 F.3d at 510–12 (holding that parents of Burmese
student dissidents constituted a particular social group); Gebremichael v. INS,
10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a
social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics
than that of the nuclear family.”). For a substantial list of additional cases
finding the existence of a particular social group, see KURZBAN, supra note 81,
at 563–69.
90. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). However, prior to
Acosta, there is at least one recorded grant of asylum for persecution on account of “cheesemaking.” Id.
91. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (B.I.A. 1985) (finding that
taxi drivers could not constitute a particular social group, because it is within
the ability of the individual to change his livelihood so as to avoid persecution), overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(B.I.A. 1987).
92. See Marouf, supra note 75; see also Canada (Attorney-General) v.
Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Aleinikoff, supra note 83, at 294.
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93

from society at large.” In an effort to unify the immutable
characteristic and the social perception tests, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) proposed the following
definition of particular social group in its 2002 Guidelines on
International Protection:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other than
their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the
94
exercise of one’s human rights.

The BIA first toyed with the idea of adding a social perception element to the Acosta standard as early as 1999—even before the publication of the UNHCR Guidelines. In Matter of RA-, the BIA rejected the particular social group of “Guatemalan
women who have been intimately involved with Guatemalan
companions, who believe that women live under male domina95
tion.” Skeptical of this particular social group definition, the
BIA feared the group was created for the purposes of the asylum application and questioned “whether anyone in Guatemala
96
perceives this group to exist in any form whatsoever.” The
BIA concluded that “there must also be some showing of how
the characteristic is understood in the alien’s society, such that
we, in turn, may understand that the potential persecutors in
fact see persons sharing the characteristic as warranting sup97
pression or the infliction of harm.” Foreshadowing an eventual
expansion of the particular social group definition, the BIA defended its inclusion of a social perception factor:
We never declared, however, that the starting point for assessing social group claims articulated in Acosta was also the ending point. The
factors we look to in this case, beyond Acosta’s “immutableness” test,
are not prerequisites, and we do not rule out the use of additional consideration that may properly bear on whether a social group should
98
be recognized in an individual case.

It is clear that at this point in time the BIA did not intend
to mandate the inclusion of social perception as a required ele93. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR
Guidelines]; see also Applicant A. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs
(1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.) (rejecting the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of
Acosta).
94. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 93, ¶ 11.
95. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 917 (B.I.A. 1999).
96. Id. at 918.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 917 (emphasis added).
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ment for the particular social group standard. In 2001, the At99
torney General vacated R-A-, and the social perception test
remained dormant for five years.
In 2006, following the publication of the UNHCR Guidelines in 2002, the BIA reinterpreted the particular social group
standard to explicitly include the elements of social visibility
and particularity. The BIA discussed these elements for the
first time in Matter of C-A- while considering a proposed par100
ticular social group of “noncriminal informants.” First, the
BIA determined that “noncriminal informants” “was too loosely
101
“‘[N]oncriminal informants’ could potentially indefined.”
clude persons who passed along information concerning any
numerous guerrilla factions or narco-trafficking cartels currently active in Colombia . . . . [I]t is important to know the
persons between whom the information is being provided, as
102
well as the nature of the information . . . .” Next, the BIA discussed social visibility, noting that “visibility is an important
103
104
element” according to the UNHCR Guidelines. The BIA
found that “noncriminal informants” was not socially visible,
because informants remain unknown until they are discov105
ered.
Echoing C-A-, the BIA reaffirmed its adoption of particularity and social visibility in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- when it
declined to find that “affluent Guatemalans” met either stand106
ard. The BIA held that the particular social group failed the
social visibility element because criminals “even target persons
with relatively modest resources or income . . . or other forms of
wealth” and, therefore, “affluent Guatemalans” are not at a
107
greater risk of crime than the general population. Moreover,
the BIA determined that the particular social group was not defined with particularity because “wealthy” and “affluent” are
“too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for deter108
mining group membership.” “Depending upon one’s perspective, the wealthy may be limited to the very top echelon [or]
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
2007).
107.
108.

See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. Jan. 19, 2001).
See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id.
See Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 69–71 (B.I.A.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 76.
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might include small business owners living a relatively com109
fortable existence in a generally impoverished country.”
A year later, in 2008, the BIA developed its most comprehensive articulation of social visibility and particularity in Matter of S-E-G-. First, the BIA defined the test for particularity as
“whether the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or
is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining
110
group membership.’” Importantly, the BIA relied on Ucelo v.
Mukasey, which held “wealth” and “affluence” to be too subjective, because they would “necessitate a sociological analysis as
to how persons with various assets would have been viewed by
111
others in their country.” Turning to social visibility, the BIA
determined that the group “should generally be recognizable by
others in the community and considered in the context of the
112
country of concern and the persecution feared.” Departing
from its initial statement in R-A- that factors “beyond Acosta’s
113
‘immutableness’ test, are not prerequisites,” S-E-G- affirmed
that particularity and social visibility are required elements, as
114
opposed to factors, of the particular social group standard.
Legal scholars and the UNHCR have suggested that the
BIA misinterpreted the UNHCR guidelines in its adoption of
“particularity” and “social visibility” in C-A-, A-M-E- & J-G-U-,
115
and S-E-G-. Under the UNHCR Guidelines, only in the absence of an immutable characteristic should “further analysis . . . be undertaken to determine whether the group is none116
theless perceived as a cognizable group in that society.” Legal
scholars, the United Kingdom, and the UNHCR have read the
UNHCR definition to permit alternative tests, as opposed to
117
dual requirements. Both legal scholars and the UNHCR ad109. Id.
110. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008) (emphasis
added) (citing Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, No. 07-2567, 2008 WL 2630085, at *3
(8th Cir. July 7, 2008)).
111. Id. at 585–86 (citing Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir.
2007)).
112. Id. at 586.
113. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918–20 (B.I.A. 1999).
114. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 66; see also A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 69; Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957–60 (B.I.A. 2006).
115. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 63 (“[A]lthough the BIA referenced the
UNHCR Guidelines in both C-A- and A-M-E-, its use of ‘social visibility’ did
not coincide with the ‘public perception’ approach described above; nor did the
BIA apply the UNHCR’s approach correctly.”).
116. UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 93, ¶ 13.
117. See Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. K, [2006] 1 AC 412, 432 (U.K.);
Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as
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vocated a return to the Acosta standard—or at least the aboli118
tion of social visibility as a required element.
Many circuit courts deferred to the BIA’s interpretation
119
and adopted particularity and social visibility without issue.
The Seventh and Third Circuits, however, remained skeptical
of adopting social visibility as part of the particular social
group standard. In Gatimi v. Holder, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit refused to accord deference to the BIA’s interpretation of particular social group because “it makes no sense; nor
has the Board attempted . . . to explain the reasoning behind
120
the criterion of social visibility.” Posner quipped that the only
way that asylum applicants could satisfy the social visibility el121
ement is by “pinning a target to their backs.”
In 2011, the Third Circuit reviewed Mauricio Edgardo
Valdiviezo-Galdamez’s particular social group for the second
time in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United
122
States. Reviewing particular social groups accepted under the
Acosta standard, Chief Judge McKee noted, “If a member of any
of these groups applied for asylum today, the BIA’s ‘social visibility’ requirement would pose an insurmountable obstacle to
refugee status, even though the BIA has already held that
membership in any of these groups qualifies for refugee sta-

Amicus Curiae at 5–6, Matter of Thomas, No. A75-597-033 (2007), [hereinafter
UNHCR Brief] http://www.refworld.org/docid/45c34c244.html; Marouf, supra
note 75, at 62.
118. See UNHCR Brief, supra note 117, at 10 (“The Board in Acosta did not
require either a ‘social perception’ or ‘social visibility’ test, and the UNHCR
would caution the Board against adopting such a rigid approach which may
disregard groups that the Convention is designed to protect.”); Lisa Frydman
& Neha Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of Asylum Claims Based on Persecution by Organized Gangs, 12-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 2 (2012) (“[T]his interpretation patently misconstrues the [UNHCR]
guidelines.”); Marouf, supra note 75, at 103 (arguing that the Acosta standard
reflects the basic principles of the 1951 Convention); Elyse Wilkinson, Comment, Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Victims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 ME. L. REV. 387,
417 (2010) (“[W]hat is most important is that the BIA clarify that social visibility is not a requirement.”).
119. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859–62 (9th Cir. 2009);
Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 58–60 (1st Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v.
Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509
F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 446
F.3d 1190, 1194–95, 1197 (11th Cir. 2006).
120. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 616.
122. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 588
(3d Cir. 2011).
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123

tus . . . .” While the Third Circuit had previously accorded the
BIA Chevron deference for its interpretation of “particular social group” in Acosta, Chief Judge McKee declared that “this
did not give the agency license to thereafter adjudicate claims
124
of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.” Hence,
the Third Circuit held that the requirement of social visibility
was not entitled to Chevron deference, because it was incon125
sistent with prior BIA decisions. The Third Circuit remanded
126
the case to the BIA for further review.
3. Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-RFollowing the Third Circuit’s decision in ValdiviezoGaldamez, the BIA reconsidered Mauricio’s case in Matter of
127
M-E-V-G-. In doing so, it rejected his particular social group
defined as “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited
by gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose the
128
gangs.” On the same day it announced M-E-V-G-, the BIA al129
so decided Matter of W-G-R-. In W-G-R- the BIA denied asylum to an applicant claiming persecution on account of membership in a particular social group defined as “former members
of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their
130
gang membership.” Together, M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- reformulated the BIA’s interpretation of the elements of particularity
and social distinction, and the evidentiary requirements for
131
proving social distinction.
According to the BIA, in order to satisfy the element of particularity, a particular social group must “be discrete and have
definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad,
132
diffuse, or subjective.” Rather, “[a] particular social group
must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear bench133
mark for determining who falls within the group.” Adjudicators must consider particularity “in the context of the society
134
out of which the claim for asylum arises.”
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 604.
Id.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 612.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228–29 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id. at 228.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id. at 209.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &. N. Dec. at 239–44.
Id. at 239.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238.
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Following its discussions of particularity in M-E-V-G- and
W-G-R-, the BIA moved to reformulate its understanding of social visibility. Correcting Posner’s interpretations in Gatimi,
the BIA noted “[l]iteral or ‘ocular’ visibility is not . . . a prereq135
uisite.” Therefore, the BIA rebranded “social visibility” as “so136
cial distinction” to eliminate any such confusion. Instead of
“ocular visibility,” social distinction requires a particular social
137
group to “be perceived as a group by society.” The perception
must be of the society in question—not solely the persecutor’s
138
perception. Though it acknowledged some overlap, the BIA
disagreed with the Third Circuit’s holding that there is no dif139
ference between particularity and social distinction. The BIA
clarified that particularity addresses the “‘outer limits’ of a
group’s boundaries,” while social distinction addresses whether
“society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently sepa140
rate or distinct.”
Following this analysis, the BIA disposed of the claim that
such an interpretation of particular social group would result in
141
“significant burdens on the applicant.” The BIA drew no distinction between the evidentiary requirements of an applicant
who claims persecution based on political opinion and one who
claims persecution based on membership in a particular social
142
group. “[T]here must be evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the par143
ticular characteristics to be a group.” As such, the applicant
may establish social distinction through corroborating evidence
“such as country conditions reports, expert witness testimony,
and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, histori144
cal animosities, and the like.”
Of the two cases, W-G-R- offers the more robust application
135. Id.
136. Id. at 240.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 242–43 (“Only when the inquiry involves the perception of the
society in question will the ‘membership in a particular social group’ ground of
persecution be equivalent to the other enumerated grounds of persecution.”).
139. Id. at 240; see also Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S.,
663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating the Court was “hard-pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of ‘particularity’ and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibility’”).
140. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (citing Castellano-Chacon
v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)).
141. Id. at 244.
142. Id.
143. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014).
144. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244.

2015]

SOCIAL GROUP SEMANTICS

377

of the reformulated particularity and social distinction ele145
ments. In assessing particularity, the BIA found “former gang
membership” was too amorphous, because it “could include per146
sons of any age, sex, or background.” “Former gang membership” was “not limited to those who have had a meaningful involvement with the gang” and included those who were
members of the gang for a short period of time or those consid147
ered a “long-term, hardened gang member.” Furthermore, the
respondent provided insufficient evidence to establish that
“Salvadoran society considers former gang members . . . a dis148
tinct social group.” The BIA rejected a report produced by
Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic
“stating that there is a societal stigma against former gang
149
members because of their tattoos.” Instead, citing the 2008
State Department report for El Salvador, the BIA concluded
that Salvadoran society does not distinguish between former
150
and active gang members.
Commentators criticized the BIA’s discussion of particularity and social distinction. According to the NIJC, particularity
“effectively precludes the use of common parlance labels to describe a [particular social group], even as the social distinction
test requires that a [particular social group] be limited by pa151
Others claimed the
rameters a society would recognize.”
BIA’s reinterpretation is contradictory to Acosta and presents
152
“equitable challenges” to asylum applicants. These advocates
153
continue to argue for a return to the Acosta standard.
Since M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, the BIA has applied its reformulated particularity and social distinction elements in only
one precedential case. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the only BIA case
to apply M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, the BIA recognized “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation145. While the BIA claims to apply these reformulated elements in Matter
of M-E-V-G-, the BIA essentially cites its analysis in Matter of S-E-G- and
Matter of E-A-G- and the opinion contains almost no new discussion. Id. at
249.
146. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19.
152. See Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social Group,” 1406 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 19 (2014).
153. Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Immigration Lawyers Association at 18, Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
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154

ship” as a cognizable particular social group. A-R-C-G- offered
an insight into the kind of evidence that may help prove social
distinction. Cultural evidence of family violence and ineffective
domestic violence laws persuaded the BIA that the proposed
155
particular social group was socially distinct. While A-R-C-Gis the first BIA decision to accept a particular social group since
the inception of the particularity and social distinction elements, it is not evidence that the BIA and circuit courts are
156
loosening the rigidity with which they apply these elements.
Circuit court decisions have been limited since M-E-V-G157
and W-G-R- but widely deferential to the BIA. The First Cir158
159
160
161
Second Circuit,
Fourth Circuit,
Fifth Circuit,
cuit,
162
163
164
Eighth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, Tenth Circuit, and Elev165
enth Circuit, have favorably cited to M-E-V-G- or W-G-R- and
applied the reformulated particularity and social distinction elements. In many of these cases, the circuit court deferred to the
BIA’s interpretation and remanded the case to the BIA for fur166
ther consideration consistent with M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-. At
the time of writing, the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuits
have not yet released an opinion analyzing either M-E-V-G- or
W-G-R-.
154. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388–89 (B.I.A. 2014).
155. See id. at 394.
156. Compare Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 392–95 (recognizing
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”),
with Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 249–53 (declining to recognize the
proposed particular social group “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs”).
157. See Sabrina Damast, How To Define Your Particular Social Group:
Case Law Developments After Matter of W-G-R- and Matter of M-E-V-G-, 20
BENDER’S IMMIG. BULL. 272, 277 (2015).
158. See Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, No. 14-1182, 2015 WL 4560270, at *2–3
(1st Cir. July 29, 2015).
159. See Paloka v. Holder, 762, F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (granting the
BIA’s interpretation in M-E-V-G- Chevron deference).
160. See Solomon-Membreno v. Holder, No. 13-1491, 578 F. App’x 300, 304
(4th Cir. 2014).
161. See Villalobos-Ramirez v. Lynch, 608 F. App’x 261 (5th Cir. 2015).
162. See Juarez Chilel v. Holder, 779 F.3d 850, 855 (8th Cir. 2015).
163. See Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2014).
164. See Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- are “consistent with [the court’s] past interpretation of social visibility”).
165. Chavez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 13-15486, 571 F. App’x 861,
864–65 (11th Cir. 2014).
166. See Damast, supra note 157, at 276 n.55 (“Following its decision in
Pirir-Boc, the Ninth Circuit remanded dozens of asylum cases involving particular social groups, citing the evolving case law . . . .”).
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As newer circuit court cases, A-R-C-G- and M-E-V-G- imply, the BIA and circuit courts are unwilling to dispose of par167
ticularity and social distinction. Scholars, NGOs, and the
Third and Seventh Circuits have raised concerns that these criteria are unworkable and unduly prejudicial toward the asylum
applicant. While it is difficult to know how adjudicators will
apply M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, precedent suggests the federal
circuit courts will be largely deferential to the BIA’s holdings.
As these elements are now permanent fixtures to the particular
social group formulation, the BIA must consider the evidentiary burden that particularity and social distinction impose on
pro se asylum applicants.
II. PRO SE PROBLEMS PROVING “PARTICULARITY” AND
“SOCIAL DISTINCTION”
Commentators have identified countless problems that social distinction and particularity pose for asylum applicants.
Social distinction creates valid concerns that the United States
168
is in violation of its international obligations. Moreover, the
addition of social distinction conflicts with prior BIA precedent
169
and is therefore unworthy of Chevron deference. A thorough
discussion of these arguments is outside the scope of this Note.
Instead, this section analyzes the BIA’s current particular social group requirements with an eye to the difficulties presented to pro se applicants looking to prove their claim. Section A
examines the problem of producing a definition that satisfies
the requirement of particularity and remains recognizable to
167. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 228 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[We] will
clarify our interpretation of the phrase ‘particular social group.’ We adhere to
our prior interpretations of the phrase but . . . we rename the ‘social visibility’
element as ‘social distinction.’”).
168. See generally UNHCR Brief, supra note 117, at 5–10 (arguing that the
BIA misinterpreted the UNHCR guidelines); Casper et al., supra note 152, at
20; Marouf, supra note 75, at 70–71 (comparing the BIA’s “social visibility” interpretation to the UNHCR guidelines). Contra Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N.
Dec. at 247–49 (asserting that recent decisions “more accurately capture[] the
concepts underlying the United States’ obligations under the Protocol”).
169. See generally BENJAMIN CASPER, “PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” LITIGATION IN THE WAKE OF S-E-G- 5–11 (Kate Evans ed., 2012), http://www
.ilcm.org/documents/litigation/ILCM_Nov_2012_CLE_Advisory_PSG_litigation
.pdf (suggesting “social visibility” under S-E-G- is unworkable, contrary to
Acosta, and contrary to Congressional policy); NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 7–9; Casper et al., supra note 152, at 22; Marouf, supra note
75, at 68–70 (arguing that Chevron deference is improper due to the BIA’s conflicting positions). Contra Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244–47
(claiming the BIA analyzed social visibility and particularity in cases prior to
the official formulation of those tests).
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the relevant society. Section B takes the problems presented in
Section A and analyzes the evidentiary requirements necessary
to satisfy the particular social group standard. This analysis
concludes that pro se applicants will be unable to satisfy these
new evidentiary requirements.
A. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PARTICULARITY AND SOCIAL
DISTINCTION
Asylum applicants—and even experienced immigration attorneys—find it difficult to formulate a particular social group
that satisfies both particularity and social distinction. The
more a particular social group is defined with particularity, the
greater the risk that it lacks social distinction. This section
looks at the interplay between these two elements. Subsection
1 analyzes the BIA’s requirements for particularity, ultimately
concluding that the criterion no longer satisfies its initial goal
of demarcating who is and who is not a member of a particular
social group. Subsection 2 combines the analysis of particularity from Subsection 1 and pairs it with social distinction. It concludes that the resulting dilemma is a game of semantics that
pro se asylum applicants are unequipped to play.
1. “Amorphous, Overbroad, Diffuse, or Subjective” Particular
Social Groups
Under the BIA’s interpretation of particularity, an applicant cannot define her particular social group with characteris170
tics that are “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”
The applicant must define the particular social group “by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who
171
falls within the group.” A well-defined particular social group
will permit an adjudicator to determine group membership
without a linguistic analysis of the words used to define the
172
group. The BIA has determined that words such as “affluent,”
173
174
“young,” and “poverty” are too subjective and amorphous to
satisfy the criteria of particularity. Instead, the BIA requires
applicants to define particular social groups with concrete, dis175
176
crete parameters. An age range replaces “young.” A mone170. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
171. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014).
172. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
173. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–87 (B.I.A. 2008).
174. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239–40 (citing Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005)).
175. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 5.
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tary income figure replaces “affluent” or “poverty.” Concrete
parameters make it simple for an adjudicator to place individuals inside or outside of the group.
Even seemingly well-defined terms, however, are not safe
from the scrutiny of particularity. In W-G-R-, the BIA reasoned
that “former [gang] members” could include “persons of any
age, sex, or background,” without regard to how long the indi178
vidual had remained a member of the gang. The respondent
had been a member of the gang “for less than a year” when he
179
left and was shot as a consequence of leaving. Nothing in the
facts indicates that the respondent’s age, sex, background, or
length of membership influenced his persecution. “Former gang
member” should thus satisfy particularity because it has definable boundaries: those who have been initiated into a gang and
180
have subsequently left. Because “former gang member” has
definable boundaries, the BIA’s call to define the group with
“respect to the duration or strength of the members’ active participation in the activity” should be inapplicable to the formula181
tion of a particular social group. Similarly, in M-E-V-G-, the
BIA suggested that “landowners” may be discrete in an “underdeveloped, oligarchical society,” but “would likely be far too
182
amorphous to meet the particularity requirement in Canada.”
A group of landowners, however, “has clear boundaries based
183
on a common definition; it just may be large and diverse.”
It is unclear why the BIA rejected “former gang members”
and “landowners” if the purpose of particularity is truly to “delineate” who is and who is not a member of a particular social
184
group. Scholars have attacked this rejection of “overbroad”
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221 (B.I.A. 2014).
179. Id. at 209.
180. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 241 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003)) (“‘[P]articularity’
chiefly addresses the ‘outer limits’ of a group’s boundaries and is definitional
in nature . . . .”).
181. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 221–22.
182. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241.
183. Casper et al., supra note 152.
184. Compare Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214 (“‘Particularity’
chiefly addresses the question of delineation . . . .”), and Matter of M-E-V-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (stating that “‘particularity’ chiefly addresses the ‘outer
limits’ of a group’s boundaries and is definitional in nature”), with Casper et
al., supra note 152, at 20 (explaining that the BIA “limits social group asylum
claims by creating standards for particularity and social visibility that work in
opposition to each other”).
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categories as contrary to the BIA’s own interpretations of par185
ticularity and the statute. No other ground of protection
(race, religion, political opinion, or nationality) requires these
precise boundaries or an evaluation of the strength of member186
ship. The BIA’s rejection of these concrete terms makes it difficult for asylum applicants and practitioners to ascertain
which words they must avoid when framing a particular social
group. With enough analysis, the BIA could reject any particular social group formulation as amorphous or subjective—other
187
than those defined with statistical precision. Therefore, particularity requires an asylum applicant to define her particular
social group with wording calculated to sustain judicial scrutiny.
2. A Game of Semantics
A particular social group formulation defined with the utmost particularity, however, is unlikely to satisfy the criterion
188
of social distinction. When evaluating social distinction, the
question is whether or not the society perceives the particular
189
social group as a distinct group. An overly-particularized particular social group is unlikely to be able to meet this standard.
A particular social group defined as “Guatemalans between the
ages of 30 and 65, who earn over $65,000 a year” is discrete and
likely satisfies the element of particularity. But, it is hard to
imagine that society would perceive the group in those terms.
The applicant would be required to prove that society perceives
the group as distinct from 29-year-olds who makes $60,000
190
year. “Young, affluent Guatemalans” is simply a more realistic interpretation of society’s perception. While such a formulation may be socially distinct, it would not satisfy the requirement of particularity. The Tenth Circuit’s holding in RiveraBarrientos v. Holder exemplifies this problem, finding that
185. See Casper et al., supra note 152, at 19–20.
186. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 7 (“The fact that the
word ‘Catholic’ might be thought to apply either to devoted practitioners or to
‘cultural’ members of the group would not preclude a religious-based claim
where Catholicism was the basis of the persecution. Yet a ‘former gang member’ group would not be cognizable simply because the boundaries of the group
may be unclear (although possibly irrelevant to the claim).”).
187. Cf. id. at 5 (“[T]he BIA requires an asylum applicant to formulate a
group in terms which are statistically precise, i.e., not using natural, common
linguistic descriptors, and also commonly recognized.”).
188. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19.
189. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240.
190. Cf. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, (suggesting concrete parameters are necessary to satisfy particularity).
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“women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang recruitment” satisfied the element of particularity,
191
but was not socially visible.
Supporters of social distinction and particularity may suggest that the BIA intended to exclude groups not defined by
gender or a highly-visible societal construct (e.g., ethnicity,
tribe, etc.). This is not the case. First, in M-E-V-G- the BIA reasserted that “[s]ocial group determinations are made on a
case-by-case basis” and reaffirmed that its decisions in S-E-Gand E-A-G- are not a “blanket rejection of all factual scenarios
192
involving gangs.” Second, since the inception of social visibility and particularity, circuit courts have recognized particular
social groups framed around government witnesses, truckers
who refuse to cooperate with insurgent groups, and other
193
groups not defined by gender or societal constructs. The BIA
has not closed the possibility of asylum to any specific group.
Instead, social distinction and particularity create unfathomable barriers for groups, otherwise entitled to asylum, to overcome. Furthermore, an attempt by the BIA to restrict the definition of particular social group in this way would be contrary
to the United States’ obligations under international law and
194
prior interpretations of domestic law.
The above observations suggest that word choice is the key
to a good particular social group formulation. Unfortunately,
most asylum applicants lack the necessary English skills to
195
The courts have
participate in this game of semantics.
191. Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 647, 650, 653 (10th Cir.
2012); see also Casper et al., supra note 152, at 20 (noting that RiveraBarrientos illustrates the tension between the social particularity requirement
and visibility requirement).
192. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 251.
193. See, e.g., Garcia v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 665 F.3d 496, 503–04 (3d
Cir. 2011) (concerning witnesses who have assisted the government in testifying against gang violence); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir.
2011) (recognizing “truckers who, because of their anti-FARC views and actions, have collaborated with law enforcement and refused to cooperate with
FARC”); Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2011) (suggesting
former military officers as a particular social group, but denying the applicant
asylum for failure to establish a nexus between his membership in that group
and his persecution); see also KURZBAN, supra note 81 (listing cases that have
found particular social groups in the past).
194. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
195. Cf. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC
TRAINING COURSE: INTERVIEWING PART VI: WORKING WITH AN INTERPRETER 5
(2006) [hereinafter USCIS INTERVIEWING] (“While some applicants can speak
English well enough to be interviewed in English without the use of an interpreter, most applicants need an interpreter during the interview.”).
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acknowledged that asylum applicants are frequently “poor, illiterate people who do not speak English and are unable to re196
tain counsel.”
In the affirmative process, asylum applicants must provide
their own interpreter (a “family member, friend, or other person associated with the [Limited English Proficiency] person”)
197
“at no expense to the Government.” Unfortunately, “[n]early
all of these interpreters are not professionally trained and they
198
do not have experience translating in formal settings.” Accurate interpretation is crucial where the interpretation of a specific word, with discrete connotations in the applicant’s own
language, may be interpreted into an English word the asylum
officer would find amorphous or vague.
This presupposes, however, that the applicant will understand the interplay between particularity and social distinction
well enough to carefully craft her particular social group in the
first place. The asylum application and its instructions do not
list the elements of a particular social group, nor do they provide a designated space for the applicant to describe their par199
ticular social group. While asylum applicants may obtain a
rudimentary understanding of social visibility and particularity
from non-profit published resources, these resources are not
200
substitutes for an experienced immigration attorney.
Even the most experienced immigration attorneys struggle
to define a particular social group with particularity and social
201
distinction. If an applicant defines her particular social group
with the requisite statistical and calculated particularity, she
risks being unable to meet the requirement of social distinction.
The BIA’s arbitrary rejection of particular social groups with
seemingly concrete membership (e.g., “former gang members”
and “landowners”) further complicates this problem. The BIA
cannot expect pro se applicants to engage in this game of se-

196. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990).
197. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DRAFT LANGUAGE ACCESS
PLAN 4 (2014).
198. Dree K. Collopy, Lost in Translation: Why Professional Interpreters
Are Critical in Asylum Interviews¸ 27 IMMIGR. L. TODAY, no. 3, May–June
2008, at 12, 14.
199. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB No. 1615-0067, I589, APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL 5–6
(2012); I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 2.
200. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, supra note 38, at 9–
10.
201. See Casper et al., supra note 152, at 20 (noting the special difficulty of
bringing “particular social group” asylum claims).
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mantics. The complexity of this game, risk of misinterpretation,
and lack of comprehensive resources makes it more likely for
deserving individuals to be denied asylum not on merit, but on
account of a technicality.
B. THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE AND THE PROBLEMS OBTAINING IT
Supposing an applicant arrives at an acceptable particular
social group formulation that survives the semantic requirements of social distinction and particularity, the applicant will
still need to provide evidence of social distinction. Subsection 1
analyzes the need for sociological evidence—as W-G-R- and AR-C-G- demonstrate through their consideration of presented
evidence. Subsection 2 suggests that only expert evidence will
be able to satisfy this need. As this section ultimately concludes, pro se applicants are generally unable to obtain expert
witnesses—let alone any corroborating evidence—thereby making it difficult for them to satisfy social distinction’s evidentiary
requirements.
1. The Need for Sociological Evidence
The applicant’s need for sociological evidence supporting
social distinction is the greatest difference between S-E-G- and
M-E-V-G-. In S-E-G-, the BIA refused to accept particular social groups that “would necessitate a sociological analysis as to
how persons . . . would have been viewed by others in their
202
country.” In contrast, M-E-V-G- requires the applicant to present evidence of social distinction, i.e., that the group is per203
ceived by the society in question. Now, social distinction requires adjudicators to engage in a “sociological analysis” to
assess the sufficiency of group perception. This evidentiary requirement imposes unnecessary burdens on applicants—in particular pro se applicants who cannot obtain evidence that is
able to satisfy the requirements of social distinction.
Shortly after the BIA decided S-E-G-, Professor Fatma
Marouf argued that IJs are not suited for sociological analy204
sis. Drawing from studies in social psychology, Marouf concluded that “social perception depends not only on the identity
of the perceiver, but the emotional states of the perceiver and
the perceived at any given moment, as well as the interactions

202. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008) (quoting UceloGomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)).
203. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 241–44 (B.I.A. 2014).
204. See Marouf, supra note 75, at 71–78.
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205

that group members have had in the past.” Simply put, “the
complexity of the human mind can never be captured in a lim206
ited legal proceeding.” Unfortunately, social distinction forces
adjudicators to analyze the “mind” of a broader society.
The asylum applicant has the burden to establish through
sufficient corroborative country condition evidence that the
207
formulated particular social group satisfies social distinction.
The BIA has provided little guidance to help applicants ascertain what evidence may establish social distinction. The discussion in M-E-V-G- suggests that applicants should provide
“country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and
press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical
208
animosities, and the like.” However, asylum applicants traditionally provide these forms in any asylum application. The
BIA has done little to substantiate what information within
these sources would illustrate social distinction.
W-G-R- and A-R-C-G- contain some discussion of these evidentiary requirements. In W-G-R-, the applicant provided reports showing that Salvadoran society recognized former gang
209
members because of their distinct tattoos. The BIA, however,
rejected this particular social group because reports indicated
that Salvadoran society discriminated against “a broader swath
of young people” suspected of gang membership, not just former
210
gang members. Furthermore, the BIA concluded that nothing
in the State Department reports suggested that former gang
211
members were socially distinct. W-G-R- evidences two trends.
First, the evidence must show that the persecution is limited to
the articulated group and not any broader (e.g., targeting only
former gang members and not youth perceived as gang members). The BIA fails to realize, however, that there is no reason
that former gang members and youth perceived as gang members could not constitute two separate particular social groups,
as gangs persecute the former, and society or specific elements
205. Id. at 72.
206. Id. at 78.
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“The burden of proof is on the applicant to
. . . establish that . . . membership in a particular social group . . . was or will
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”); accord Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244; In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (B.I.A.
1997) (“The absence of such corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that
an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof.”).
208. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 244.
209. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 222 (B.I.A. 2014).
210. Id.
211. Id.
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within the society (e.g., police, vigilante groups, and rival
gangs) persecute the latter. As a second trend, the BIA gives
greater deference to State Department reports than to the applicant’s own evidence.
A-R-C-G- presents an interesting lens with which to analyze evidentiary requirements, as it is the first and only precedential example where the applicant proved social distinction.
News articles showing that Guatemala has a culture of “machismo and family violence” persuaded the BIA that “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relation212
ship” were socially distinct. Unlike in W-G-R-, the State Department reports supported social distinction because they revealed that the Guatemalan government fails to prosecute
213
domestic violence crimes. More generally, the BIA said in
cases of domestic violence it would look for evidence of “whether the society in question recognizes the need to offer protection
to victims of domestic violence, including whether the country
has criminal laws designed to protect domestic abuse victims,
whether those laws are effectively enforced, and other sociopo214
A-R-C-G- reaffirms the importance of the
litical factors.”
State Department reports—in the eyes of the BIA—in assessing social distinction. More perplexing, though, is that the
BIA relied on more generalized evidence (i.e., news articles) in
A-R-C-G- compared to the specific well-studied reports cited in
215
W-G-R-. This observation raises concerns that the BIA inconsistently weighs evidence. However, this Note cannot evaluate
this claim with the limited sample size of BIA cases currently
available.
2. The Necessary Evidence
Ultimately, few conclusions can be drawn about what evidence persuasively illustrates social distinction. References to
the harmed group in the State Department reports appear to be
the most persuasive form of evidence to the BIA. State Department reports, however, are conclusory and “risk carrying ‘a
weight they do not deserve’ because they may oversimplify the
relationship between political conditions, human rights abuses,
212. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 392–94 (B.I.A. 2014).
213. See id. at 393–94.
214. Id. at 394.
215. Compare id. at 393–94 (citing the State Department report and tangentially related news articles), with Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 222
(citing HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, NO PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 101 (2007)).
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and the particular situation of the applicant.” State Department reports cannot describe every problem in a society, which
may lead an adjudicator to believe the problem does not exist.
Nor do the reports provide citations to other sources or information about how facts are gathered. The applicant is not provided with a meaningful opportunity to rebut the evidence presented in the State Department report. As the Eighth Circuit
recognized in Banat v. Holder:
Reliance on reports of investigations that do not provide sufficient
information about how the investigation was conducted are fundamentally unfair because, without that information, it is nearly impossible for the immigration court to assess the report’s probative value
and the asylum applicant is not allowed a meaningful opportunity to
217
rebut the investigation’s allegations.

Even so, certain IJs have denied asylum applications as a
result of information obtained from unofficial sources that are
218
just as vague and hard to verify—namely Wikipedia.
Applicants must carefully select additional country condition information from news articles, non-governmental organizations, and similar print sources and be able to explain how
the evidence relates to social distinction. An adjudicator may
quickly dispose of social distinction if the evidence suggests
that the group is broader than the formulated particular social
group. However, in some cases, the persecution may be underreported internationally or in the society in question. In
such cases, the applicant may have a difficult time finding evi-

216. Susan K. Kerns, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum
Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
197, 211 (2000).
217. Banat v. Holder, 557 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2009).
218. See, e.g., Sibanda v. Holder, 778 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (“During the hearing, he quizzed [the applicant] about the custom of bride-price, comparing her answers to a Wikipedia article he had in
front of him. But we have no way of knowing what that article said or how reliable it was, and it appears that the IJ never shared the article with [the applicant]. Asylum regulations and case law invite IJs to consider reports produced by the State Department and other credible sources in evaluating
country conditions. Although the IJ was not required to obtain country reports
on his own initiative, . . . because the IJ already had found the Wikipedia entry, he could just as easily have retrieved more reliable country reports and
properly put them into the record.”); Singh v. Holder, 720 F.3d 635, 643–44
(7th Cir. 2013) (“As a means of testing religious belief, IJ Zerbe questioned
Singh on the tenets of Sikhism using information gathered from Wikipedia. . . . IJ Zerbe . . . seemed only interested in answers that parroted back the
exact language of the Wikipedia entry . . . . IJ Zerbe’s behavior was inappropriate. . . . Rather than seeking a verbatim recitation of an encyclopedia article, IJs should listen to a petitioner’s personal explanation of religious beliefs.”).
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dence to establish that society, not solely the persecutor, recog219
nizes the particular social group. Country conditions are limited to what has been published, and the adjudicator is accorded significant deference in choosing how to interpret the
provided material.
Given the scrutiny under which the BIA has examined corroborative country condition evidence, most cases will require
the assistance of an expert witness. The NIJC encourages attorneys to use “academics or professionals with substantial
scholarly credentials” as expert witnesses to establish social
220
distinction whenever possible. An expert witness can provide
sociological evidence that distinguishes the applicant’s particular social group from the society as a whole. An expert is also
more likely to prevent the adjudicator from conducting her own
sociological analysis, instead synthesizing the expert’s own
knowledge with the provided country conditions and the facts
of the applicant’s case to explain to the adjudicator how the
particular social group is recognizable to the society in ques221
tion.
The expert witness is the strongest tool an applicant has in
222
proving social distinction. Unfortunately, most pro se applicants cannot afford to hire counsel, let alone an expert wit223
ness. Therefore, in most cases, a pro se applicant will be limited to evidence brought from her home country or found in
documented sources. In many cases, the applicant may only be
able to provide her testimony.
Even USCIS’s own guidelines admit that asylum applicants—and experts, such as human rights monitors—have difficulty obtaining corroborative evidence. According to USCIS,
“[t]he most common form of evidence that informs asylum eligi-

219. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) (requiring the perception to be of the society in question, not the persecutor).
220. NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 10.
221. Cf. Matter of Marcal Neto, 25 I. & N. Dec. 169, 176 (B.I.A. 2010)
(“Immigration Judges, like other trial judges generally, are often required to
determine factual disputes regarding matters on which they possess little or
no knowledge or substantive expertise, and, in making such determinations,
they typically rely on evidence, including expert testimony, presented by the
parties.”).
222. See NIJC M-E-V-G- ADVISORY, supra note 19, at 10 (describing the increasing importance of country condition experts in asylum cases).
223. One source estimates that the average cost of a non-medical expert
witness ranges from $275 to $322 per hour, depending on the services provided. Joe O’Neill, Expert Witness Fees: An Infographic, THE EXPERT INST. (Sept.
23, 2014), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fees/.
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bility is the applicant’s own testimony.” USCIS acknowledges
that “[b]ecause of the circumstances that give rise to flight, asylum applicants often will not be able to provide documentary
225
evidence.” The Seventh Circuit too has stated that “[t]o expect [an applicant] to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork before fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the
226
harrowing conditions they face.” Persecutors usually “do not
227
provide evidence of their persecution.” “Human rights monitors and reporters may have difficulty documenting abuses in
some refugee-producing countries that do not allow human
rights monitors access to the country and maintain firm control
228
over the press.” Given USCIS’s acknowledgement of the difficulties in obtaining general corroborating evidence, it is unreasonable to require pro se applicants to obtain evidence supporting societal perception. The evidentiary requirements of social
distinction ignore the difficulties applicants—and even experts—have in obtaining satisfactory sociological evidence.
Pro se applicants may not even realize the need to provide
such in-depth evidence. The asylum application instructions inform the applicant to “submit reasonably available corroborative evidence showing (1) the general conditions in the country
229
from which you are seeking asylum . . . .” As explained above,
societal perception is not found in “general” country conditions.
An objective reading of the above requirement suggests applicants should submit news articles, government reports, and the
like; not sociological expert testimony on societal group perception. And, an applicant is unlikely to have notice that they will
be questioned regarding the societal perception of their proposed group, as the elements of a particular social group are
230
not listed in the instructions.
The BIA cannot realistically expect asylum applicants to
produce expert witnesses at removal proceedings or asylum interviews, especially when it barely provides notice of the evidentiary requirements of social distinction in the first place.
The evidentiary requirements of social distinction ignore the
economic and social situations from which most refugees come.
Even USCIS has acknowledged the difficulties applicants have
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 16.
Id. at 19.
Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2005).
USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43, at 19.
Id.
I-589 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 32, at 7.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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in obtaining general country condition information. The affirmative asylum process alleviates some of this burden by requiring the asylum officer to “provide background country conditions information through sources such as Refworld, the
USCIS intranet, the Asylum Division Virtual Library, and oth232
ers.” These traditional forms of documentary evidence, however, rarely contain evidence of social distinction tailored to
specific particular social groups. Furthermore, the BIA requires
defensive applicants to provide their own country condition evidence. A system of precedential country condition fact-finding
may alleviate some of these evidentiary burdens on pro se asylum applicants.
III. ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF GUIDANCE DECISIONS
Critics of social distinction and particularity have called for
a reformed standard. In particular, they advocate for a return
to the Acosta standard as the only way to eliminate the preju233
dice caused to pro se applicants. The BIA, however, refuses to
234
abrogate the social distinction and particularity elements.
While the circuit courts, the Supreme Court, or Congress could
overturn the BIA precedents in M-E-V-G- and W-G-R-, such a
solution seems unlikely at this time. Instead, the BIA should
adopt an alternative system of precedential fact-finding to alleviate the burden on pro se applicants. Section A describes how
the United States could adopt a system similar to the United
Kingdom’s Country Guidance system. This proposed system
would permit the BIA to issue precedential decisions based on
commonly reoccurring situations in asylum adjudications. Sec231. See USCIS EVIDENCE TRAINING, supra note 43 at 29 (explaining that
an applicant “may not understand which documents are relevant to his or her
claim,” and that “there generally is insufficient time for an applicant to provide any additional documentation that may take more than a short period of
time to access”).
232. Id. at 23.
233. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 152, at 22 (“Other options for advocacy could include asking the Attorney General to certify an appropriate case
in order to roll back the Board’s flawed social group precedents, seeking a social group regulation consistent with Acosta, or pursuing a legislative fix.”);
Marouf, supra note 75, at 104 (“Adjudicators could easily avoid such chaos by
remaining true to Acosta’s law-based standard.”).
234. See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014)
(“[W]e adhere to the social group requirements announced in Matter of S-E-Gand Matter of E-A-G-, as further explained here . . . . We believe that these requirements provide guidance to courts and those seeking asylum based on
‘membership in a particular social group,’ are necessary to address the evolving nature of claims asserted on this ground of persecution, and are essential
to ensuring the consistent nationwide adjudication of asylum claims.”).
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tion B responds to possible critiques of this system, concluding
that the benefits of the proposed system, despite imperfections,
offer significant improvements over the current absence of protection for pro se asylum applicants.
A. A SYSTEM OF UNITED STATES GUIDANCE DECISIONS
In his opinion in Banks v. Gonzales, Judge Easterbrook
stated, “An IJ is not an expert on conditions in any given country, and a priori views about how authoritarian regimes conduct themselves are no substitute for evidence—a point that we
235
have made repeatedly, but which has yet to sink in.” This
need for a country condition expert in every case could be circumvented through the creation of precedential “Guidance Decisions” modeled after the United Kingdom’s Country Guidance
System.
Analysis of an actual Country Guidance Determination in
the United Kingdom reveals the potential benefits of such decisions. AMM Somalia concerned five asylum claims arising from
236
risks of persecution from Al-Shabab and FGM. The Tribunal
began by broadly describing the humanitarian crisis in various
237
regions of Somalia. Following this, the Tribunal spent 327
paragraphs weighing the oral testimony of the 5 appellants, 2
expert witnesses, and 1266 documents of background evi238
dence. Having critiqued the presented evidence, the Tribunal
laid out a succinct statement of fact-finding and the legal impli239
cations of that finding. The Tribunal’s FGM guidance is illustrative of how the Country Guidance Determination informs
the lower courts to apply the fact-finding:
The risk will be greatest in cases where both parents are in favour
of FGM. Where both are opposed, the question of whether the risk
will reach the requisite level will need to be determined by reference
to the extent to which the parents are likely to be able to withstand
the strong societal pressures. Unless the parents are from a socioeconomic background that is likely to distance them from mainstream
social attitudes, or there is some other particular feature of their case,
the fact of parental opposition may well as a general matter be inca-

235. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 2006).
236. See AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445, [54] (IAC) (stating the scope
of the decision).
237. Id. at [73]–[81].
238. See id. at [241]–[567]; id. at app. 1 [1]–[146] (summarizing the testimony of each appellant, one appellant’s partner, and two expert witnesses); id.
at app. 2 [1]–[1266] (listing all of the documentary evidence provided).
239. See id. at [594]–[610] (providing the Country Guidance Determination
for Somalia).
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pable of eliminating the real risk to the daughter that others (particu240
larly relatives) will at some point inflict FGM on her.

Country Guidance Determinations accomplish three objectives. First, they allow the Tribunal to consider a large amount
of evidence and set standards for interpreting this evidence in
future adjudications. As such, Country Guidance Determinations eliminate the need for lower courts to weigh country condition evidence in every decision. This promotes consistency
from case to case. Second, they allow the Tribunal to consider
many potentially related humanitarian issues at once. By joining cases with similar, although somewhat different claims, the
Tribunal may efficiently engage in broader country condition
analysis. In contrast, the United States has had numerous asy241
lum cases arising from Somalia, none of which can draw on
the previous country condition fact-finding of the others due to
242
the case-by-case nature of United States asylum law. Third,
the Country Guidance Determination narrows the focus of future cases because it presents a succinct question by which the
lower court should analyze similar claims. The Country Guidance Determinations promote consistency and efficiency by
eliminating the need to conduct country condition fact-finding
in every case.
A United States system of Guidance Decisions would alleviate some of the problems in analyzing evidence of social dis243
tinction. A proper analysis of social distinction necessarily requires substantial documentary evidence and expert testimony.
By combining similar claims into a single precedential factfinding case, the BIA can address reoccurring issues in one decision. IJs and asylum officers will not need to analyze the
country condition evidence in every case. Less fact-finding will
result in quicker consideration and adjudication of asylum
claims. Quicker adjudication will lessen the backlog of Immi240. Id. at [610].
241. See, e.g., Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing “Somali females” as a particular social group due to the prevalence of
female genital mutilation); Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 2005)
(accepting the “Muuse Diriiye clan” as a particular social group); Matter of SA-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464, 465–66 (B.I.A. 2008) (granting asylum to
a mother and daughter subjected to female genital mutilation); In re H-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 337, 340–42 (B.I.A. 1996) (accepting the “Marehan subclan” as a
particular social group).
242. Cf. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006) (“While Taylor ruled Liberia, all ethnic Krahns (and Unity Party supporters) should have
been treated the same way. . . . We remanded . . . because the agency had
failed to confront that recurring question.”).
243. See supra Part II.B.
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gration Court cases, which has risen from 113,702 pending cases in 1998 (with an average wait time of 324 days) to 422,104
244
cases in 2015 (with an average wait time of 627 days). Moreover, this would alleviate the burden on the applicant to present sociological evidence in cases where the BIA has rendered
a Guidance Decision. Pro se applicants would not need to hire
expert witnesses or collect substantial documentary evidence.
They would only need to provide evidence of their own personal
persecution.
Broadly, the proposed system would work as follows. The
BIA would identify cases that are representative of a recurring
245
issue in asylum adjudications and consolidate the appeals. In
addition, the BIA would permit advocates to petition for a case
or group of cases to be heard as a Guidance Decision. These
cases would be heard at a single hearing, with all applicants
and their counsel given a chance to present their arguments.
The BIA would frame the proposed issue around (1) specific
country conditions; (2) a particular social group; or (3) a wide246
spread form of persecution. For example, the BIA could issue
decisions addressing when asylum is appropriate for victims of
247
or which particular social groups may
domestic violence,
248
claim asylum due to Salvadoran gang persecution. The BIA
would then notify the applicant, the government, and the public that the case would be a Guidance Decision. The applicant
and the government would create extensive evidentiary records
supporting their respective arguments on the proposed issue.
Academics and non-profits could submit comments and additional documentary evidence. The BIA would permit amici curiae, such as the UNHCR, NIJC, and other non-profit organiza-

244. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool: Pending Cases and Length of
Wait in Immigration Courts, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog/ (last updated Sept. 2015) (tracking the number of
immigration-related charges from 1998 to 2015, excluding criminal/national
security/terrorism charges).
245. Cf. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.10, at 66 (2015)
(“[T]he Board may consolidate . . . appeals where the cases are sufficiently interrelated.”).
246. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 511–14 (describing how the United
Kingdom Tribunal identifies risk categories and risk factors in issuing country
guidance).
247. Cf. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391 (B.I.A. 2014) (describing the history of domestic violence-based asylum claims).
248. Cf. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (acknowledging that scenarios may exist in which applicants facing gang-related
persecution could be awarded asylum).
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249

tions, to file briefs and present evidence. In circumstances involving complex or broad issues, the BIA would permit amici
250
curiae to present oral arguments. The BIA would then consider all presented evidence at an oral hearing.
The BIA would frame its Guidance Decision similar to the
Tribunal’s decision in AMM Somalia. The BIA would begin
with a thorough analysis of the evidence and its factual findings. It would then issue a guideline for lower courts to adjudicate similar issues. Because adjudicators evaluate claims on
case-by-case basis and country conditions constantly evolve,
this guideline would not be a strict rule but a measurement of
when a case satisfies the requirements of asylum. An example
of this is the FGM guideline in AMM Somalia, where the Tribunal instructs lower courts to examine the parents’ opinions of
251
FGM. The purpose of such formulations is to draw the inquiry away from the country conditions generally and to the
applicant’s own personal situation. The resulting Guidance Decision would bind “all officers and employees of the Department
of Homeland Security or immigration judges in the administra252
tion of the immigration laws of the United States . . . .”
The basic regulatory structure for this system already ex253
ists. The Department of Justice would need to amend current
regulations to allow the BIA to engage in fact-finding and provide structure for the Guidance Decision process. Under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3), the BIA is prohibited from engaging in de
254
novo review of facts or engaging in fact-finding. The Depart249. See BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, supra note 245, § 2.10, at 30 (“The Board
may grant permission to an amicus curiae to appear, on a case-by-case basis,
when it serves the public interest.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1(d) (2014) (permitting the appearance of amicus curiae).
250. Cf. BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, supra note 245, § 8.7(e)(xiii), at 104
(“Amicus curiae may present oral argument only upon advance permission of
the Board.”).
251. AMM Somalia CG, [2011] UKUT 445, [610] (IAC).
252. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2014).
253. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (citing federal regulations describing the BIA’s standard of review).
254. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–(iv) (“The Board will not engage in de
novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. . . . [T]he
Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals.”). This
Note is not oblivious to the burdens the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
poses to administrative rulemaking. Some commentators have deemed the
regulatory process confusing and circular, leading to many dead ends. See
Maxwell Mensinger, Note, Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive Language That Grounded the Unmanned Industry Should Cease to Govern It, 100
MINN. L. REV. 405, 409, 433 (2015); Samuel D. Posnick, Note, A Merry-GoRound of Metal and Manipulation: Toward a New Framework for Commodity
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ment of Justice would need to amend the regulation to allow for
fact-finding in Guidance Decisions. The regulations would restrict the use of precedential fact-finding to country conditions
in asylum cases. After the BIA issues a Guidance Decision, the
BIA would remand the case to the IJ for further review in con255
formance with the recent decision. The Department of Justice
will also need to promulgate rules permitting the use of Guidance Decisions and describing when the BIA should issue such
decisions. The rule, however, must allow the BIA wide discretion in choosing when to use Guidance Decisions.
Guidance Decisions result in efficient and consistent adjudications of asylum cases. In commonly reoccurring cases the
BIA would be able to engage in broad fact-finding, saving IJs
and asylum officers the trouble of having to hear expert testimony and sort through thousands of pages of country conditions evidence. Furthermore, this form of decision-making better protects pro se applicants as it lessens the evidentiary
burden on them. In a comprehensive Guidance Decision the
BIA can identify socially distinct groups for future adjudications. While this solution is not a return to Acosta, it does alleviate some of the evidentiary burdens placed particularly upon
pro se applicants.
B. CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM AND SOLUTIONS TO
ADDRESS THOSE CRITICISMS
Critics drawing from the experience of the United Kingdom
256
will note problems with this proposed system. Of course, such
a system creates a demand for more judicial resources in the
short-term, but the potential to clear the Immigration Court
docket of years of backlogged cases and quick adjudication of
257
common asylum claims renders this complaint moot. Aside
from this complaint, however, this Note addresses two primary
concerns. First, country conditions will change faster than the
BIA can amend or change a Guidance Decision. Second, a poorly-decided precedential decision affects more than just the present applicant and has the potential to bar thousands of appliExchange Self-Regulation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 441, 454–60 (2015). These procedural burdens, however, are inherent in any notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, and this Note therefore ignores them.
255. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (“If further factfinding is needed in a particular case, the Board may remand the proceeding to the immigration judge
or, as appropriate, to the Service.”).
256. For further critiques of the United Kingdom Country Guidance system, see generally IMMIGRATION ADVISORY SERVICE, supra note 70.
257. See supra Part III.A.
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cants from obtaining asylum. Despite the risk of careless decision-making, this Guidance Decision system remains the only
way of insulating pro se applicants from the troubles of proving
social distinction—other than by an abrogation of particularity
and social distinction through judicial or congressional action.
1. Changing Country Conditions
“[C]ountry guidance is always at the risk of becoming—or
258
Country conditions
appearing to become—out of date.”
change faster than the United States immigration system can
respond to them. A coup in a country could suddenly entitle
thousands of refugees, who under a previous Guidance Decision
would be ineligible, to asylum. Of the two presented counterarguments against a United States system of Guidance Decisions, this is the least troublesome. Practically, if such a severe
refugee crisis would call for immediate action, the Secretary of
Homeland Security may protect such refugees by granting
them Temporary Protected Status, until such time that the BIA
259
may reconsider its previous Guidance Decision. Moreover, the
BIA could implement safeguards to ensure that Guidance Decisions do not prevent IJs from deciding in favor of otherwise
qualified asylum applicants.
First, Guidance Decisions would be authoritative guidance
as long as the case “(a) relates to the country guidance issue in
260
question; and (b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.”
Yet country conditions will change, forcing IJs to decide cases
contrary to prior Guidance Decisions. “No judicial decision has
the power of crystallizing the facts of the real world to an extent where not reality, but what has been said about it is the
261
guide.” Adjudicators, however, must still evaluate asylum
applicantions on a “case-by-case basis” and can avoid being
262
bound to obsolete Guidance Decisions. Applicants in removal
proceedings, and the opposing counsel for ICE, have the opportunity to produce evidence showing that the original decision
was wrongly decided, country conditions have changed, or the
Guidance Decision is inapplicable to the applicant based on the

258. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505.
259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) (2012) (permitting Temporary Protected Status designation in cases of armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances).
260. PRACTICE DIRECTIONS, supra note 68, ¶ 12.2.
261. LT Turkey CG, [2004] UKIAT 175, [3] (IAT).
262. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 227 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled
on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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263

individualized facts of the case. The BIA should not overturn
IJ decisions where individualized facts warrant ignoring a
Guidance Decision as a result of newly presented evidence that
renders the Guidance Decision inapplicable to the applicant’s
case, or out of date. The BIA, however, should overturn IJ decisions that ignore Guidance Decisions that would otherwise protect the applicant. For example, suppose Matter of A-R-C-Gwere a Guidance Decision establishing that the particular social group of “married women . . . who are unable to leave their
relationship” satisfied all three elements of the particular social
group standard in countries, such as Guatemala, that fail to
264
protect women from domestic violence. The BIA should overturn any decision from an IJ concluding that “women who are
unable to leave their relationship” is not socially distinct in
Salvadoran society, if El Salvador also fails to protect women
from domestic violence.
Second, applicants would be free to challenge Guidance
Decisions where the decision has been “superseded by a change
265
in country conditions.” The BIA must be able to freely amend
and abrogate Guidance Decisions as new evidence shows substantive changes in the country conditions. As the Court of Appeal of England and Wales acknowledges, “‘no country guidance
case is for ever’ [sic]; such decisions are always open to revision
in the light of new facts—new either in the sense of being newly ascertained or in the sense that they have arisen only since
266
the decision was promulgated.” As such, the BIA would issue
a new Guidance Decision in order to adapt its previous decision
to changed circumstances. Until reconsideration is possible, IJs
would continue to favorably decide asylum cases contrary to an
otherwise unfavorable Guidance Decision, as discussed above.
Finally, the BIA can tailor its Guidance Decisions to pre267
vent them from becoming “too rigid.” First, the BIA can include flexibility within the language of its Guidance Decisions
263. See Thomas, supra note 23, at 517 (“Country guidance cases should be
applied except where they do not apply to the particular facts raised in a subsequent appeal and they can properly be held inapplicable for legally adequate
reasons, such as a change in country conditions. The country guidance system
‘does not have the rigidity of legally binding precedent but has instead the
flexibility to accommodate individual cases, changes, fresh evidence and . . .
other circumstances.’”).
264. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
265. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505.
266. Id. at 517 (citing KH (Sudan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t
[2008] EWCA Civ 887, [4] (Sedley LJ) (CA)).
267. Id. at 518.
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to ensure that while most individuals may or may not be protected, the IJ has the discretion to find otherwise in any particular case. For example, while the United Kingdom Tribunal
found that “Afghan Sikhs and Hindus are not at risk of . . . persecution . . . simply by reason of being members of those minority communities anywhere in Afghanistan,” the Tribunal made
a point to note that certain individuals may still be subject to
268
societal discrimination in their given communities. Second,
the BIA can indicate whether or not a decision is likely to re269
quire revisiting in the near future. A Guidance Decision analyzing country conditions in a politically turbulent country is
much more likely to need correction sooner than a Guidance
Decision finding a particular social group for those subjected to
270
a targeted form of persecution. For example, a Guidance Decision similar to Hassan v. Gonzales, which creates a particular
social group for those who oppose FGM, is unlikely to require
future amendment because a cultural practice such as FGM is
unlikely to change in the near future and will never be an ac271
ceptable practice according to human rights law. Providing a
temporal element to the Guidance Decisions informs IJs that a
decision may soon become outdated as a result of shifting country conditions. Then, IJs know to more carefully examine evidence to determine if an applicant who would be ineligible under a preexisting Guidance Decision is now eligible as a result
of changing country conditions. By flexibly framing the decision
and acknowledging when it is likely to change, the BIA can
create a malleable Guidance Decision that remains authoritative, but allows IJs to adjust as new evidence emerges and
when individualized facts warrant protection.
2. Poor Precedent Prejudices Future Applicants
The risk of poor precedent is the most dangerous aspect of
the proposed system and must be addressed. Of course, appli-

268. See SL and Others (Returning Sikhs and Hindus) Afghanistan CG
[2005] UKIAT 00137, [76] (IAT).
269. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 519 (noting that the United Kingdom
Tribunal occasionally indicates when its guidance may “soon be overtaken by
events in the country concerned”).
270. See, e.g., id. (comparing country guidance cases relating to politically
unstable countries like Iraq with country guidance cases relating to longstanding issues such as female genital mutilation or persecution of religious
minorities).
271. Cf. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
Somali females who are threatened with female genital mutilation as a particular social group).

400

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:355

cants would be able to appeal to the circuit courts for errors of
law. However, circuit courts, as shown throughout this Note,
tend to be highly deferential to the BIA. Therefore, an appeal
may not afford applicants substantial protection in the case of a
bad decision.
Poorly decided Guidance Decisions may affect a large
group of future applicants—setting poor factual precedent for
272
future cases. Because a poorly decided Guidance Decision
may bar thousands from seeking asylum for any given reason,
a United States system would necessarily require substantial
public input. Indeed, advocates would reject the adoption of a
273
system that does not allow for such input. The United States
system would permit scholars, non-governmental actors, and
other advocacy organizations to file amici curiae briefs with additional evidentiary reports in support of their own conclusions.
In this respect, the BIA would be forced to examine public
commentary and an evidentiary record comprised of all available country condition evidence.
The procedure for gathering third-party evidence would be
conducted in a manner similar to Administrative Procedure Act
274
notice-and-comment rulemaking. The BIA would publish a
notice in the Federal Register providing a timeframe for sub275
mission of documentary evidence. The BIA would permit legal scholars, social scientists, non-profit organizations, other
federal agencies, and interested individuals to submit articles,
scholarly works, human rights reports, and other studies,
which it would then consider at the adjudication. More influential and informed commentators—the NIJC, UNHCR, the State
Department, and other non-profits and NGOs—would submit
full amici curiae briefs and potentially present oral arguments
before the BIA. Necessarily, the United States system must be
inquisitorial in nature, allowing for the creation of a full record,
but must also permit both the government and appellant to
present their respective arguments before the BIA.
272. Cf. Thomas, supra note 23, at 505 (“Good country guidance presupposes good country information.”).
273. Cf. Brief of the National Immigration Justice Center as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 13–17, Holder v. Gutierrez, No. 10-1542, cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1542_respondent_
amcu_nijc.authcheckdam.pdf.
274. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (describing the process of noticeand-comment rulemaking).
275. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be
published in the Federal Register . . . .”).
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Ultimately, the applicant’s counsel, non-profits, amici curiae, and other interested parties have a duty to ensure the BIA
reviews all potential evidence. The submission of documentary
evidence by members of the public, amici curiae briefs, and potentially the oral arguments of amici curiae would protect future applicants from the present applicant’s ineffective counsel.
Professor Robert Thomas acknowledges the risk a Guidance
Decision system would present if the fact-finding “were strictly
confined to the body of evidence presented before it by the par276
ties” in an adversarial system. For this reason, the BIA has a
duty to develop the above-described procedures and widely accept amici curiae and publicly submitted documents, in addition to granting the most authoritative amici curiae time for
oral arguments, when issuing a Guidance Decision. The participation of a wide range of actors ensures that the BIA reviews
all available evidence and preserves some notion of procedural
due process.
Pro se asylum applicants do not have the funds or knowhow to obtain the necessary sociological evidence—almost always from expert witnesses—to present a compelling asylum
claim. Under the proposed system, amici curiae, as well as a
skilled appellate immigration lawyer, have the opportunity to
speak for a large class of people. Even if the BIA issues a poorly
reasoned decision that denies the future pro se applicant relief,
it is unlikely that said applicant would have been able to produce the requisite evidence anyway. And, arguably, the BIA already relies on unfavorable precedent to deny applicants with
277
similar claims. Countless individuals, however, could be protected from the evidentiary burdens with the release of a beneficial Guidance Decision. While the BIA must create procedures
promoting an environment for fair adjudication, the onus is on
skilled immigration attorneys and amici curiae to create a
compelling record and strive for a beneficial country guidance
determination.
Currently, pro se applicants lack any protection from the
burdens of the current evidentiary requirements of proving the
existence of a particular social group. This proposed Guidance
Decision system is just one method—with researchable results
from the United Kingdom—to lessen these evidentiary burdens. Without a return to Acosta, the BIA must put some prec276. Thomas, supra note 23, at 509.
277. See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 249–51 (B.I.A. 2014)
(relying heavily on Matter of S-E-G- and E-A-G- in assessing the proposed particular social group).
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edential fact-finding regime in place to protect future applicants. As discussed extensively in Part II, pro se applicants
cannot be expected to produce the colossal record necessary to
prove social distinction. This system places the duty of creating
such an evidentiary record in the hands of a team of competent
immigration lawyers and expert witnesses who can ensure protection for future asylum applicants. As Judge Easterbrook
stated, “What cannot continue . . . is administrative refusal to
take a stand on recurring questions, coupled with reliance on
278
IJs to fill in for the expertise missing from the record.”
CONCLUSION
Indisputably, neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the
1980 Refugee Act adequately define “particular social group.”
As the Third Circuit stated in Fatin v. INS:
Both courts and commentators have struggled to define “particular
social group.” Read in its broadest literal sense, the phrase is almost
completely open-ended. Virtually any set including more than one
person could be described as a “particular social group.” Thus, the
279
statutory language standing alone is not very instructive.

Adjudicators need a standard to determine whether or not
individuals are members in a particular social group. And, for
280
over twenty years, Acosta provided that standard. Now, the
BIA seeks to tighten the particular social group standard with
the elements of particularity and social distinction.
Yet pro se applicants cannot successfully play the game of
semantics that emerges as a result of the interplay between
particularity and social distinction. If an applicant avoids the
wrath of particularity by defining her particular social group
with statistical precision, she will struggle to find sufficient sociological evidence supporting the recognition of that particular
social group in the society in question. Social distinction and
particularity erect evidentiary barriers that pro se asylum applicants cannot be expected to overcome. This Note’s proposed
solution of Guidance Decisions is a practical system that will
alleviate some of the burden on pro se applicants. Such a system will lessen the evidentiary burden by creating precedential
fact-finding cases, thereby reducing the amount of country condition evidence that will need to be produced by any individual
asylum applicant. This Guidance Decision system better protects pro se applicants by providing them with a team of advo278. Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2006).
279. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993).
280. See supra Part I.B.1.
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cates. Experienced immigration attorneys and amici curiae can
advocate at a Guidance Decision hearing not only for their own
client, but also for future pro se applicants who may otherwise
be denied protection due to evidentiary pitfalls. Until the BIA
implements such a system, pro se applicants will continue to
lose this game of social group semantics.

